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Abstract
This paper studies the consumption decisions of agents who face costs of acquiring, absorbing
and processing information. These consumers rationally choose to only sporadically update their
information and re-compute their optimal consumption plans. In between updating dates, they
remain inattentive. This behavior implies that news disperses slowly throughout the population,
so events have a gradual and delayed eﬀect on aggregate consumption. The model predicts that
aggregate consumption adjusts slowly to shocks, and is able to explain the excess sensitivity
and excess smoothness puzzles. In addition, individual consumption is sensitive to ordinary and
unexpected past news, but it is not sensitive to extraordinary or predictable events. The model
further predicts that some people rationally choose to not plan, live hand-to-mouth, and save
less, while other people sporadically update their plans. The longer are these plans, the more
they save. Evidence using U.S. aggregate and microeconomic data generally supports these
predictions.
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1“Attention as the Scarce Resource. [...] Many of the central issues of our time are questions of
how we use limited information and limited computational ability to deal with enormous problems
whose shape we barely understand.”
Herbert A. Simon (1978, page 13)
“Perhaps it is not surprising that many people do not report an expectation given the costs of it.”
Sherwin Rosen (1990, page 284)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most economists would agree that a rational consumer sets the marginal utility of consuming in
the present equal to the discounted marginal utility of consuming in the future times the price
of present relative to future consumption. After all, this is just the basic optimality condition
from consumer choice that the marginal rate of substitution between two goods must equal their
relative price. If the future is uncertain though, it is expected marginal utility that is relevant, and
a crucial component of a model of consumption must specify how agents form their expectations.
In a pioneering contribution, Hall (1978) assumes that agents form expectations rationally in the
Muth sense: they know the entire structure of the economy and have full information on all the
relevant variables needed to form statistically optimal forecasts. Rational expectations leads to the
prediction that consumption should be a martingale: consumption growth should not be predictable
over time. Hall’s ﬁnding that post-war U.S. aggregate consumption approximately follows a random
walk was an early empirical success of rational expectations modelling.
Over the past 25 years though, many papers have found problems with the Hall model. Devia-
tions of aggregate consumption from a martingale in the data have been convincingly established,
taking the form of either excess sensitivity of consumption to past known information, or excess
smoothness in response to permanent income shocks.1 Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990) illus-
trate these failures by showing that if the world is partially populated by rational expectations
agents, then there must be as many irrational consumers who consume their current income every
period, in order to match the data on aggregate consumption.
This paper revisits the modelling of expectations formation by consumers. With rational ex-
pectations, agents can costlessly absorb and process information on all the relevant characteristics
of the economy, can costlessly think through this information, and can costlessly calculate optimal
forecasts and actions. I assume instead that it is costly for agents to acquire, absorb, and process
information in forming expectations and making decisions. In a dynamic setting, while agents with
rational expectations undertake these costly activities at every instant in time, in this paper, agents
rationally choose to update their information and plans infrequently: Expectations are rational,
1Consumption is excessively sensitive (Flavin, 1981) if future consumption growth depends on lagged information.
It is excessively smooth (Deaton, 1987) if it does not respond one-to-one to shocks to permanent income, and thus is
smoother than permanent income.
2but are only sporadically updated. Following a new event, many agents will be unaware of the news
for a while, and will continue following their outdated plans, only eventually updating their expec-
tations. Agents are inattentive and the information in the economy is sticky, gradually dissipating
over time to the entire population. Consumption in turn is excessively sensitive, since when agents
adjust plans and consumption, they react to all the information (present and past) since their last
adjustment date. Consumption is also excessively smooth, or insuﬃciently sensitive to permanent
income shocks, since only a fraction of agents are attentive when there is a shock to permanent
income and react to it instantly.
The model in this paper has further predictions beyond people’s inattentiveness, excess sensi-
tivity, and excess smoothness. It also predicts that while aggregate consumption moves sluggishly
in response to shocks, the extent of this sluggishness is endogenously determined by the size of the
information costs and income volatility, which may be diﬀerent in diﬀerent periods. Moreover, the
model predicts that consumers only respond with a delay to a news that was not easily anticipated
far in advance and that did not refer to some extraordinary event that captured everyone’s atten-
tion. Finally, the model predicts that about one third of the U.S. population rationally chooses to
never plan, live hand-to-mouth, and save very little.
A few papers have recently explored the potential of modelling inattentiveness. Gabaix and
Laibson (2001) assume that investors update their portfolio decisions infrequently, and show that
this can explain the puzzling premium of equity over bond returns. Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2003)
study inattentiveness on the part of price-setting ﬁrms and show that the resulting model of the
Phillips curve matches well the dynamics of inﬂation and output that we observe in the data.
Relative to these papers, this paper diﬀers by focusing on consumption decisions and deriving
predictions for individual and aggregate consumption, which are empirically tested.2 Moreover,
I do not assume that agents infrequently adjust their plans, but rather I derive this behavior
endogenously as the optimal response to explicitly modelled costs of planning.
Sims (2003) and Moscarini (2004) develop an alternative model of rational inattention. Both
use Shannon’s information theory to model the costs of obtaining information and solve for the
optimal choice of which pieces of information to pay attention to, and how to use these to infer the
current state of the world. Their approach is very complementary to the one in this paper, since
the models diﬀer more in focus than in substance. Sims and Moscarini focus on the information
problem facing agents, at the cost of simplifying the study of their real actions; this paper focuses on
these real decisions, their interaction with inattentiveness, and in deriving predictions to contrast
with data, at the cost of simplifying the information acquisition problem.3
2Carrol and Sommer (in progress) also study the empirical implications of slow dissemination of information for
aggregate consumption.
3A few other theoretical papers have explored consumption decisions with limited information: Goodfriend (1992)
and Pischke (1995) assume that agents cannot distinguish between permanent and transitory income shocks, Ameriks
et al. (2003b) model absent-minded consumers who cannot keep track of how much they have already consumed, and
Mullainathan (2002), Bernheim and Thomadsen (2002), and Wilson (2003) model agents who have full information
on the present but recall the past imperfectly.
3Recent empirical work using microeconomic data has also emphasized that most people are
inattentive and that this aﬀects their behavior. Lusardi (1999, 2002) and Ameriks, Caplin, and
Leahy (2003a) ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant fraction of survey respondents make ﬁnancial plans infrequently
(if at all) and that their planning behavior has a statistically signiﬁcant and sizeable eﬀect on the
amount of wealth they have accumulated. This paper contributes to this literature a theoretical
model of costly and infrequent planning. Inattentiveness rationalizes these authors’ ﬁndings and
suggests further implications to test using observations of individual behavior.
More generally, this paper is part of a recent wave of research rethinking how to model the
process by which people form their expectations. Some have assumed that people instead use
simple least squares learning algorithms to form their expectations of the future (see Evans and
Honkapohja, 2001, for a survey). Others have studied models in which agents’s expectations are
consistent with the data while not using all of the available information (Kurz, 1997), and still others
model agents as choosing between diﬀerent simple mechanisms to form expectations according
to their past performance (Brock and Hommes, 1997). Which is the right approach to model
expectations is at this point still unclear (and many of these approaches are not mutually exclusive).
One virtue of the inattentiveness model is that it remains ﬁrmly rooted in classical economics, in
that agents are modelled as maximizing utility subject to constraints, the novelty being that the
constraints also include costly information. One can therefore use the powerful tools of constrained
optimization and rational expectations with limited information that economists have for long
developed, to quickly get very far in terms of predictions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 informally describes the model of inattentiveness
and intuitively describes its predictions. Section 3 rigorously sets up the general problem of an
agent facing costs of planning, and derives the optimality conditions describing consumption and
planning behavior. It aggregates individual consumption decisions over many such agents to obtain
the predictions of the model for the time-series of aggregate consumption, which will later be
tested in the data. Section 4 solves the inattentive agent’s problem analytically for a particular
speciﬁcation of preferences and uncertainty. This provides further implications and intuition on
the eﬀects of costly planning on savings and optimal inattentiveness.
Section 5 tests the implications of the model with aggregate and individual data. The model
is also contrasted with models of rule-of-thumb behavior, habit formation, and state-contingent
adjustment. Section 6 focusses on the informational assumptions of the model and discusses some
extensions of the basic model. Section 7 concludes by collecting the many theoretical results and
empirical estimates in the paper into a coherent description of individual and aggregate consumption
in the United States, and by discussing directions for future research.
42 An informal description of inattentiveness and its predictions
Consider the problem facing a person who lives forever, earns a stochastic income and consumes
every period, and maximizes utility subject to a standard budget constraint. The new assumption
in this paper is that despite being fully rational and making optimal choices, this person must incur
a cost whenever she acquires information and makes optimal decisions. This is the cost in money
and time of obtaining information, processing and interpreting it, and deciding how to optimally
act. It can be interpreted as the money spent acquiring information and paying a ﬁnancial advisor
to interpret the information and compute the optimal ﬁnancial plan, or it could stand for the
opportunity cost of taking the time to plan. While I model these costs as a monetary expense, they
c a nb et h o u g h to fa st h ew a g e sf o r e g o n ea tt i m e sof planning, if planning takes time away from
supplying labor at a market wage and leisure enters utility separately from consumption. Likewise,
modelling the costs of planning as additive reductions in utility, because some people may ﬁnd the
process annoying or frustrating, leads to similar results to the ones discussed in this paper.
Facing these costs, a person setting a plan of action for consumption must choose not only
what to consume, but also when to plan again. With regards to her consumption plan, between
two periods which are in between planning dates, the person is not obtaining any new information.
Therefore, the dynamics of consumption are as if the consumer was living under perfect certainty,
with consumption following a pre-determined plan, irrespective of the news in the economy.4 On the
other hand, optimality with respect to consumption at two successive planning dates is determined
by a stochastic Euler equation, just as in the Hall model. At planning dates, the consumer obtains
new information and takes the random arrival of news into account in trading oﬀ current for future
consumption.
Costly planning and inattentiveness aﬀect not just the dynamics of consumption, but especially
its level. The longer a person stays inattentive for, the larger is her exposure to risk, since she is
not reacting to shocks as they occur. This larger risk leads in turn to higher precautionary savings
in order to safeguard against a sequence of bad income shocks. Therefore, if a person faces higher
planning costs, she plans less often, and saves more.
The optimal length of inattentiveness weights the costs of reacting with a delay to news against
the costs incurred by planning. There are several interesting properties of optimal inattentiveness.
First, a person who faces very small costs of planning can be inattentive for a long time. The
reason is that being inattentive and reacting only with a delay to news is close to being optimal in
the sense of implying only a small loss in welfare. The second property of optimal inattentiveness
is that the lower is the risk faced by the person and the lower her aversion to this risk, the longer
she will be inattentive for. The lower these are, the smaller is the eﬀective cost of being inattentive
in terms of exposure to risk, and thus the less frequently the desire to adjust plans. A third less
intuitive property is that a larger interest rate lowers optimal inattentiveness. Inattentiveness leads
4In the psychology literature, Bargh and Chartrand (1999) describe this as “the unbearable automaticity of being.”
5to sub-optimal savings and the larger is the interest rate, the larger is the impact of these ineﬃcient
savings on her future assets.
So far, I have been describing the problem of a person who chooses plans for consumption. Yet,
she could instead set plans for her savings. If the agent has full information or if there is no income
uncertainty, then the two are indistinguishable. But if the agent is not monitoring her income every
instant, she must choose to either set a plan for consumption and let savings adjust to the shocks,
or to set a plan for savings and let consumption adjust. More concretely, an inattentive consumer
is someone whose paycheck is deposited in her bank account, spends a planned amount, and leaves
whatever remains in the bank. An inattentive saver is someone who receives her paycheck in her
pocket, puts aside a planned amount in savings, and spends the rest until her pocket is empty.
One immediate implication of inattentive saver behavior is that consumption absorbs all of the
income shocks. Therefore, the marginal propensity to consume out of current income is one, so the
inattentive savers live hand-to-mouth. Another important feature of the behavior of an inattentive
saver is that, as long as the costs of planning are not too small, it is optimal to never plan at all.
To understand the intuition behind this result, consider the special case in which income shocks are
serially uncorrelated. If the person does not update her information this period, next period’s assets
equal this period’s assets plus savings and capital returns, all of which are not random. Therefore,
the agent is facing exactly the same problem as in the previous period, and thus she must again
choose not to update her plans. Iterating on this logic shows that the saver will either always be
attentive, or never update her plans. If the cost of planning is not too small, she will choose to
never plan. The inattentive saver is a rational non-planner.
Having characterized the behavior of inattentive consumers and inattentive savers, the next
question is which do people choose to be. In the case where the inattentive savers rationally choose
to never plan, they are unaﬀected by the costs of planning. The inattentive consumers on the
other hand are worse oﬀ the larger are these costs. It then follows that if the costs of planning are
above a certain threshold, people only choose savings plans, whereas if they are below, they will
choose a consumption plan. This gives the following characterization of behavior in an inattentive
economy: some agents have high costs of planning and optimally choose to live hand-to-mouth
and never make plans. The other agents, who have lower planning costs, opt instead for following
infrequently-updated plans on consumption.
In this inattentive economy, aggregate consumption responds gradually to a shock, with a
reaction that builds up over time. The reason is that people only gradually update their plans and
become aware of the news, which only slowly disseminates throughout the entire economy. If the
shock aﬀects income then in the inattentive economy one will ﬁnd that aggregate consumption is
excessively sensitive, since past income shocks aﬀect current consumption growth. Moreover, since
only a fraction of the agents react contemporaneously to changes in permanent income, consumption
will be smoother than income. Slow dissemination of information can therefore solve both the excess
sensitivity and excess smoothness puzzles.
6Finally, note that the inattentiveness model reﬁnes the meaning of tests for excess sensitivity. In
an inattentive economy, a consumer responds to present and past shocks only if she could not predict
them when she last planned. Past predictable events do not aﬀect present individual consumption
changes. Moreover, it is reasonable to extend the baseline model to allow people to observe some
extraordinary events when they take place. The deﬁning features of these events is that they refer
to changes in variables that only move infrequently, so the cost of monitoring them is very small,
and which lead to large changes in the agent’s income. For instance, if the agent suddenly becomes
unemployed or wins the lottery, it is reasonable to suppose that the agent becomes immediately
aware of these rare signiﬁcant events, and responds to them. Past extraordinary events do not
aﬀect present individual consumption changes.
Summarized and simpliﬁed, these are the main features of the theory of inattentive consumption.
The next two sections formalize this description, before turning to the evidence in Section 5.
3 The general inattentiveness model
3.1 The set-up of the problem
I model the problem of the inattentive consumer in continuous time, so that the planning dates
are chosen from a continuous set.5 Time is indexed by t on the positive real line while the decision
periods are denoted by D(i) where i ∈ N0 orders the decision times so that D(i +1 )≥ D(i) for
all i with D(0) ≡ 0.I f d(i) denotes the time until the next adjustment, deﬁned recursively as
d(i)=D(i)−D(i−1), it is clearly equivalent for the agent to choose the calendar dates of planning
D(i) or the inattentiveness intervals d(i).
The economy is populated by many inﬁnitely-lived consumers, who each instant consume an
amount of goods ct, which yields an amount of utility given by the function u(ct). This function is
continuous, everywhere twice diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave, and future utility is discounted
at the positive rate ρ.
Each instant, the agent receives an income ﬂow y(x), and her assets at earn returns at the
interest rate r.T h eﬂow budget constraint is dat =( rat−ct+y(xt))dt, stating that at each instant,
assets increase by the interest earned plus new savings, st = y(xt) − ct. Borrowing is constrained
by the condition that all debts must be repaid, so the agent cannot run Ponzi schemes rolling over
debt forever: limt→∞ e−rtat ≥ 0. Income is a function of a state vector xt, of potentially very large
dimension, which is generated by a continuous time stochastic process deﬁned on a standard ﬁltered
probability space {X,F,P} where X is the set of possible states, F is the ﬁltration F = {Ft,t≥ 0}
where Ft is the σ-algebra through which information on xt is revealed, and P is the probability
measure on F. I will write y(xt) more compactly as yt. The notation Ek [.] will be used to denote
the expectation conditional on information up until time k: Ek [yt]=
R
ytdP(Fk). I further assume
5An earlier version of this paper solved the model also in discrete time. Details are available from the author.
7that the state vector has the Markov property, and, without loss of generality, that it is arranged in
such a way that it is ﬁrst-order Markov. Therefore, a suﬃcient statistic for the probability of any
state yt ∈ Y from the perspective of time k<tis the state vector at time k: P(yt | Fk)=P(yt | xk).
The consumer’s choice of planning dates deﬁnes a new ﬁltration = = {=t,t ≥ 0} such that
=t = FD(i) for t ∈ [D(i),D(i +1 ) ) . When the consumer writes a plan at time D(i − 1),s h eﬁrst
makes a decision on whether to write a plan for consumption ct or a plan for savings st.E a c h
period, the agent visits a goods market and an asset market; she can choose to either follow a plan
of conduct in one or in the other market. Having decided on the type of plan, the agent must then
choose the content of the plan which consists of a sequence of actions until the next adjustment,
z(i)=[ zD(i−1),z D(i)) where z equals c or s, and when to plan again D(i). The restriction embodied
in the existence of a plan is that these choices must be contingent on the information available at
time D(i − 1):i f{z,D} = {z(i),D(i)}∞
i=1 these must be =-adapted processes.
Whenever she plans, the consumer incurs a ﬁxed monetary cost given by Kt ≡ K(xt),w h i c h
can be stochastic and time-varying. If the consumer enters period D(i) with assets given by a−
D(i),
her wealth then changes discontinuously to a+
D(i) = a−
D(i) − KD(i).6 Formally, a−
D(i) is the left-hand
side time limit of assets, while a+
D(i) is the right-hand side limit, and they diﬀer by the ﬁxed cost.












s.t. : z(i)=c(i) or s(i),( 2 )
{z,D} are =-adapted, (3)
dat =( rat − ct + yt)dt, (4)
st = yt − ct, (5)
a+
D(i) = a−
D(i) − KD(i),for all i ∈ N0, (6)
lim
t→∞
e−rtat ≥ 0, (7)
with initial conditions a0, x0.I ti sd i ﬃcult to solve this problem both because it is hard to impose
the measurability restriction (3) and because of the discontinuity in the level of assets at the
planning dates (6). To make progress, the problem must be re-stated in a more convenient form.
Start by integrating the law of motion for assets in (4) between D(i) and D(i+1), and replace
a−
D(i) by a+














6Implicit in this setup is the assumption that while it is costly to re-write new plans, this can be done in an instant
of time. I could assume instead that it takes a ﬁxed interval of time to devise a plan. While this would require some
modiﬁcations to the analysis that follows, it would not aﬀect the main conclusions.
8thus eliminating the a−
t variables, so that only a+
t ’s are left. Moreover, realize that there is a
recursive structure between planning dates so the cumbersome time indices can be dropped by
denoting a+
D(i) by a and a+
D(i+1) by a0,a n ds i m i l a r l yxD(i) by x and xD(i+1) by x0. Next, let V (a,x)
be the value function associated with this problem. The state vector is (a, x) since the law of
motion for assets and the Markov assumption for the state vector imply that (a,x) is a suﬃcient
statistic for the uncertainty facing the agent until the next planning date.
With these changes, the problem in (1)-(7) becomes:
V (a,x)=m a x {V c(a,x),Vs(a,x)}, (8)



























⎠ − K0. (11)
Focussing on the consumption problem, the measurability constraints are imposed by having passed
the expectations operator through {c,d}, so that these choices are made conditional only on the
information in (a,x). The only unknown at this planning date is what assets and accumulated
income will be by the next planning date. As for the initial conditions, note that since there is
planning at time 0,the initial post-planning asset level is a0 − K0.7
The solution to the problem in (9)-(11) will be a pair of functions, ct(a,x) or st(a,x) and d(a,x),
determining optimal consumption or savings from time 0 to time d and when the next planning will
take place. Consumption or savings at any date between 0 and d is inattentive since it is chosen
regardless of the state of the world at that date. In turn, the date of the next adjustment does
not depend on the state at that date — adjustment is not state-contingent. However, adjustment is
also not purely time-contingent, since the date of the next adjustment depends on the state of the
world at the last adjustment. For lack of better words, I describe adjustment with inattentiveness
as recursively time-contingent: it occurs at a pre-set date which depends recursively on the state
at the past planning date. In some cases, d(a,x) might be independent of (a,x),i nw h i c hc a s et h e
inattentiveness model leads to purely time-contingent adjustment.
The problem in (9)-(11) is a familiar dynamic programming problem. If the utility function
is bounded, arguments similar to those in Stokey et al. (1989) prove the existence of a solution
and give the necessary restrictions for uniqueness of this solution. With an unbounded-from-below
utility function, the problem of the inattentive consumer has one additional technical diﬃculty
7Some related problems have been studied in engineering under the headings: sampled-data control systems, and
digital control. The two closest to this paper are control problems in which the state is observed at exogenously given
infrequent dates (Franklin et al., 1990), and optimally choosing how often to sample a continuous time stochastic
process to maximize the information content of the messages (Miller and Runggaldier, 1997).
9relative to the full information problem. To illustrate it, consider the case in which income follows
an arithmetic Brownian motion, which has inﬁnite local variation. If the agent is inattentive for
even an instant then with positive probability her income may fall to a very large negative number
inducing her to borrow a very large amount. Satisfying the intertemporal budget constraint would
then require setting consumption so low that utility would be unbounded from below, so being
inattentive could never be optimal. On the other hand, being always attentive cannot be optimal
since it involves an inﬁnite expenditure of resources in planning, so the problem does not have a
well-deﬁned solution.
There are two ways to get around this problem. A reasonable solution is to simply assume that
income follows a bounded stochastic process that cannot fall extremely every instant. If the reader
of this paper knew that in the instant it takes to read this sentence while being inattentive to her
income, her life circumstances could change so suddenly as to throw her into a life of bondage, she
would never read anything at all and would go through life doing nothing but monitoring income
every instant. This is not the case for most people, so it is reasonable to assume it is also not the
case for the inattentive consumer. A second solution to the problem is to retain the mathematical
convenience of using Wiener processes for income, while specifying preferences that do not run
into the problem. For instance, assuming that the utility function is of the constant absolute risk
aversion form and allowing consumption to sometimes be negative is enough to guarantee a well-
deﬁned optimization problem. This is the approach that I will follow in section 4, and it is also
the approach in the engineering literature which focusses on quadratic objective functions or H∞
control (Chen and Francis, 1995).
3.2 Characterizing the solution
Taking the derivative of (9) with respect to d and setting it equal to zero gives:












This ﬁrst-order condition states that the agent plans to adjust when the marginal cost of adjusting
equals the marginal beneﬁt of doing so. On the left-hand side is the ﬂow of value from extending
the interval of non-adjustment, which is the utility the agent would get if she kept to her outdated
consumption plan. On the right-hand side is the value of adjusting at time d.T h eﬁrst term is the
present ﬂow value of having re-planned and obtained new information, while the second term is the
beneﬁt from acquiring this information at d rather than in the next instant when this value has
fallen. The cost K enters the ﬁrst-order condition on the right-hand side by lowering the beneﬁts
of planning through the fall in assets by K to a0 at the planning date.
Consider ﬁrst the case of an inattentive consumer. It is easy to show that the ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to ct and the envelope theorem condition imply that if the consumer is
inattentive between times t and s>t , consumption between these periods obeys the deterministic
10Euler equation:
u0(ct)=e(r−ρ)(s−t)u0(cs). (13)
If D(i) and D(i +1 )are two successive planning dates, consumption between these periods obeys






The dynamics of inattentive consumption over time are therefore simple to describe. During the
intervals of inattentiveness, consumption evolves just like in the standard consumer problem with
certainty. At adjustment dates, consumption evolves just like in the standard consumer problem
with uncertainty. Intuitively, between adjustments the agent is not receiving new information so
it is as if there is no uncertainty; at adjustments, information is revealed and optimal choices
incorporate it.
If the agent instead chooses a savings plan, then the most interesting result is that consumption
moves one-to-one with income since ct = yt − st and st does not respond to income news. The
optimal path for st is determined by Euler equations similar to the ones above.
3.3 Aggregate consumption
There are many inattentive agents in the economy, individually behaving in the way described
above. They have the same preferences but diﬀer for instance in their realization of income shocks
and in the costs of planning they face. They therefore diﬀer in whether they choose consumption
or savings plans, on how much they consume or save, and on how long they stay inattentive for.
First focus on the choices of inattentive consumers; at the end of this section I will consider
savers as well. Following the literature, I work with linearized versions of the optimality conditions.9
A ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of (13) around the point where ct = cs and r = ρ gives:
cs = ct +
1
α
(r − ρ)t, (15)
where α = −u00(ct)/u0(ct) is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. A similar approximation of
(14) leads to:
cD(i+1) = cD(i) +
1
α
(r − ρ)t + eD(i+1),D(i), (16)




, the innovation to consumption between D(i) and
D(i +1 ) ,w h e r eD(i) ≤ s ≤ t ≤ D(i +1 ) .
Consider then the change in consumption of any inattentive consumer between t and t +1 .I f
she has not adjusted her plan between t and t+1, then her behavior is described by equation (15)
8To be rigorous, here cD(i) is the right-side time limit, whereas cD(i+1) refers to the left-side time limit.
9This is not to say that these non-linearities are not important. Attanasio and Weber (1995) argue that they can
signiﬁcantly aﬀect tests of the Hall model. Examining their eﬀect on the inattentiveness model is left for future work.
11with s = t+1. If she has adjusted, then let j denote how long ago starting in t+1did the agent last
adjust, and similarly, let i denote how long starting from t o n em u s tg ob a c kt ot h el a s ta d j u s t m e n t
date for that same agent. Then, combining equation (15) and (16) establishes the relation between
consumption choices at t and t +1by these agents:




Summing over all of the inattentive consumers in the economy, it is then easy to see that
Ct+1 − Ct = constant + ut+1,
where Ct is aggregate consumption by inattentive consumers and ut−1 is a sum of the et+1−j,t−i of
the diﬀerent people in the economy. This has the property Et−I [ut+1]=0 ,w h e r eI is the largest
amount of time during which consumers remain inattentive. We therefore get the result:
Proposition 1 Aggregate consumption growth by inattentive consumers between t and t+1should
be unpredictable from the perspective of t − I information, where I is the largest amount of time
during which consumers remain inattentive.
With full information (I =0 ), Hall (1978) ﬁrst showed that any variable dated t or before should
not predict consumption growth between t and t+1. With inattentive agents, events between t−I
and t predict consumption growth, since some consumers who had been inattentive, update their
information and plans between t and t +1and only then react to past events.
Assuming that there is a ﬁnite number of people in the world, and that the et+1−j,t−i can be
broken into independent homoskedastic increments, Appendix A shows that:
Proposition 2 Aggregate consumption growth by inattentive consumers can be written as:
Ct+1 − Ct = constant + Φ(0)et+1 + Φ(1)et + ... + Φ(I)et−I+1, (17)
with Φ(s) ≥ Φ(s +1 )≥ 0 for s =1 ,2,...,I,while Et−s [et+1−s]=0deﬁnes the innovations.
It is appropriate to call the et’s “news” since they are mutually uncorrelated and are unpre-
dictable one period ahead. The Φ(s)’s correspond approximately to the share of agents in the
population that update their information between t and t +1and had last done so at or before
t−s. Thus, they are non-increasing in s.T h es i z eo fΦ(s) depends on the length of inattentiveness
chosen by consumers, so to make equation (17) empirically testable with a time series, one must add
the assumption that the economy has converged to a stationary distribution of inattentiveness.10
10Reis (2004) derives an interesting result regarding this distribution: if the decisions of when to adjust are mutually
independent over time and across consumers, and the costs of planning are almost surely positive and such that
inattentiveness is not always a constant multiple of some integer, then the stationary distribution will be exponential.
12Equation (17) reveals another implication of the model for aggregate consumption. With full
information, consumption responds immediately to the news (Φ(0) = 1 and Φ(s)=0for s ≥ 1),
since all agents are attentive and so react immediately. With inattentiveness though, when news
arrives, consumption rises immediately by Φ(0). The following period, consumption rises further
but now by the smaller amount Φ(1), and the following period it rises further by the even smaller
amount Φ(2), and so on until I periods after. The impulse response of aggregate consumption to
a shock is therefore increasing for a few periods, and concave. A related implication from equation
(17) is that consumption growth depends on past news with more recent news receiving a larger
weight than older news does. Combining these two results:
Proposition 3 Aggregate consumption by inattentive consumers exhibits:
a) Slow adjustment - the impulse response of consumption to shocks is increasing and concave.
b) Slow dissemination of information - consumption growth depends on current and past news and
the estimates from regressing consumption growth on current and past news are non-increasing in
how far in the past the news had arrived.
While the Hall (1978) model predicts that aggregate consumption should follow a random walk,
equation (17) implies that the change in aggregate consumption should follow an MA(I) process
with positive coeﬃcients. Turning to the frequency domain emphasizes the diﬀerence between the
two: the normalized power spectrum of aggregate consumption changes ( f∆C(ω)) is horizontal in
the Hall model, but has a shape determined by Φ(s) in the inattentiveness model. Moreover, Gali
(1991), following Deaton (1987), showed that ψ ≡ 1/
p
2πf∆C(0) equals the excess smoothness
ratio, that is the square root of the ratio between the variance of changes in consumption and
the variance of changes in permanent income.11 In the Hall model, this ratio equals one, since
consumption reacts immediately one-for-one to changes in permanent income, so ﬁndings of ψ<1
have been described as revealing excess smoothness of consumption. Appendix B shows that:
Proposition 4 In the inattentiveness model:














11H e u r i s t i c a l l y ,G a l i ’ sa r g u m e n tg o e sa sf o l l o w s . T h ev a r i a n c er a t i oo fD e a t o ni sψ =
s
Va r(∆C)/V ar(∆Y P),
where Y
P denotes permanent income. Gali notes that since the agent faces a budget constraint, changes in permanent
income must lead to changes in permanent consumption, so Va r(∆Y
P)=Va r(∆C
P).B u t2π times the normalized
spectrum at frequency zero of consumption changes measures exactly the fraction of the variability of consumption
changes driven by permanent movements: 2πf∆C(0) = Va r(∆C
P)/V ar(∆C).T h a tψ =1 /
s
2πf∆C(0) then follows.
13b) The excess smoothness ratio is:
ψ =






If some agents are inattentive for at least one period, consumption is excessively smooth.
Note that if there is excess smoothness, then it must be that Φ(i) 6=0for some i>0,s ot h e r e
is excess sensitivity. Yet, excess sensitivity per se does not necessarily imply excess smoothness.
Proposition 4 shows the tight relation between excess sensitivity and excess smoothness in the
inattentiveness model.12 Any particular pattern of excess sensitivity coeﬃcients (Φ(i))i m p l i e sn o t
just excess smoothness, but also an exact value for ψ. The model requires that the same set of
parameters must ﬁt these two related but distinct features of the data.
Finally, I turn to the behavior of inattentive savers. Following very similar steps, it is easy to
show that for these agents
ct+1 − ct = constant + yt+1 − yt + et+1−j,t−i, (20)
where, as before, et+1−j,t−i captures news on savings to inattentive savers whose most recent plan-
ning date since t +1was at t +1− j and most recent planning date since t was at t − i.N o t e
especially that if j>1,t h e nj = i +1and et+1−j,t−i =0 . If, for instance, savers never plan, then
all their et+1−j,t−i are zero.
Aggregating over the inattentive savers then leads to a similar expression as in (17) but now
with an added term involving the change in the aggregate income of inattentive savers. Aggregating
over all of the consumers in the economy then leads to:
Proposition 5 Aggregate consumption growth over all agents can be written as:
ˆ Ct+1 − ˆ Ct = constant + λ(Yt+1 − Yt)+ˆ Φ(0)et+1 + ˆ Φ(1)et + ... + ˆ Φ(I)et−I+1, (21)
where λ is the share of aggregate income going to inattentive savers and the ˆ Φ(s) and et+1−s have
the same properties as in Proposition 2.
This result shows that regressing consumption growth on income growth, instrumenting the lat-
ter with information lagged at least I periods will give an estimate of the share of inattentive
savers in the economy. This reﬁnes the prediction in proposition 1 that consumption growth is
unpredictable I periods ahead: with inattentive savers, consumption will respond to movements in
income predictable as of I periods ahead, but only through the behavior of inattentive savers.
12Campbell and Deaton (1989) link excess sensitivity and excess smoothness in the rational expectations model.
14Propositions 1 to 5 give a set of predictions that can be tested using aggregate data. Yet the
available measurements of consumption do not give consumption at an instant in time, but rather
as the sum over a time period. In other words, while the Propositions assert implications for Ct+1,
the available observations are of ¯ Ct+1 =
R 1
0 Ct+1−sds. Nevertheless, as Appendix A shows, this
only aﬀects equation (17) insofar as it turns the MA(I) process into an MA(I +1 )with a new
set of coeﬃcients which are still non-increasing. All the propositions are likewise aﬀected solely by
replacing I by I +1 .
4 Functional form assumptions and further predictions
The problem of optimal consumption over time with stochastic labor income even with full infor-
mation only has a closed-form solution for particular forms of the utility function. In this Section,
I derive further implications of the model making assumptions on the utility function, the income
process and the costs of planning, that lead to a closed-form solution while being roughly consistent
with the data.
I assume that the utility function is of the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) form:
u(c)=−e−αc/α,
where α>0 is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. It is well-known that this is one of the
few utility functions for which the full information problem has an analytical solution. Also for
tractability, I assume that the costs of planning are ﬁxed at a constant K.13
Following Friedman (1957), I assume that income is the sum of two independent components.
The ﬁrst component is permanent income, denoted by yP
t , which is assumed to follow a driftless
Brownian motion with variance σ2
P and Wiener increments dzP
t . This corresponds for instance
to changes in employment status or to changes in experience, training or education. The second
component is transitory income, yT
t , which is assumed to follow an Orstein-Uhlenbeck process (a
continuous time AR(1)), with mean reversion speed φ and independent Wiener impulses σTdzT
t .
Shocks to transitory income aﬀect income only temporarily, and the larger is φ the more short-lived
their eﬀects are. For instance, these could stand for overtime payment, illness, or winning a prize.
If permanent income is observed at discrete points in time, it generates observations matching
a discrete-time random-walk, while transitory income observed in discrete time is an AR(1). In-
come changes therefore follow an ARMA(1,1) process. MaCurdy’s (1982) seminal study of annual
earnings in the United States ﬁnds that this speciﬁcation describes the data well.14 If φ is large,
13As is well-known, a caveat of the CARA model is that it lacks absolute wealth eﬀects. These would lead, given
a ﬁxed K, to richer people planning more often. If the cost of planning is interpreted as a cost of time though, it is
reasonable to expect that planning involves a higher opportunity cost for the wealthy, in which case they may plan
more of less, depending on the precise assumptions made about K.
14MaCurdy (1982) ﬁnds that an MA(2) ﬁts the data equally well, and his ﬁndings have been conﬁrmed by Abowd
and Card (1989), Pischke (1995), and Meghir and Pistaferri (2003).
15income changes will be close to the MA(1) process originally proposed by Muth (1960).
4.1 Optimal consumption and inattentiveness
First, I solve the problem of an inattentive consumer. Deﬁning the consumer’s wealth, wt,a st h e
sum of her assets, at, and the present value of her expected income, yP
t /r + yT
t /(r + φ),t h el a wo f
motion for wealth is:









Whereas generally the agent must keep track of at and yt separately in order to assess how her
constraints will evolve, (22) shows that in this case wt is a suﬃcient statistic. I can then write the
value function as V (wt), reducing the dimension of the state space. The agent solves the problem:



































Denoting the variance of wealth shocks by σ2 ≡ σ2
P/r2 + σ2
T/(r + φ)2, Appendix C proves:
Proposition 6 In the CARA-utility, ARMA-income, inattentive consumer problem, the optimal












Optimal consumption between adjustments, for D(i) <t<D (i +1 ) , is:
c∗
t = rwD(i) +


























t denotes the consumption decisions of an agent that has K =0a n ds oi sa l w a y sa t t e n t i v e ,











Corollary 1 At time 0, in the CARA-utility, ARMA-income problem, inattentive agents consume
less than attentive ones. The larger are the costs of planning, the longer they are inattentive for,
and the more they save.
The lower consumption is due to two reasons, captured by the two terms in (28). The ﬁrst
16reason is that costly planning lowers the agent’s wealth, since she must pay an amount K every
d∗ periods, and lower permanent income reduces optimal consumption. The present value of this
periodic expense is given by the second term in the right-hand side of (28). The second reason for
lower consumption is that the inattentive agent is more vulnerable to risk, since she only period-
ically adjusts her behavior to take account of the income shocks that are arriving every instant.
Savings after expenditure on consumption and planning is therefore higher for precautionary rea-
sons captured in the third term in (28), which increases in the length of inattention. Larger costs
of planning lead to longer periods of inattentiveness thus strengthening the precautionary motive
and raising savings.15
Inspecting the optimal inattentiveness in (25) establishes:
Corollary 2 In the CARA-utility, ARMA-income case, inattentiveness by a consumer (d∗):
1. Falls with the volatility of the income shocks (σ2);
2. Falls with the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion (α);
3. Falls with the real interest rate (r);
4. Increases with the costs of planning (K);
5. Is ﬁrst-order long with only second-order costs of planning.
In a world that is quickly changing in which income is volatile, it is very costly to not pay
attention to news so people avoid being inattentive for long. Similarly, if people are very averse to
risk, they will want to lower the risk they face by updating information more often and respond-
ing to shocks faster. This does not imply that higher volatility is beneﬁcial by inducing greater
attentiveness. Quite on the contrary, a higher σ2 unambiguously lowers welfare, since it increases
uncertainty which the risk-averse agent dislikes, and moreover it forces her to spend more resources
updating plans more frequently. If policy can stabilize the economy, it will raise welfare by allowing
people to be inattentive and direct their resources towards productive uses, rather than towards
planning consumption.
Between planning dates the inattentive consumer (dis)saves all the unexpected changes in in-
come, whereas the full-information consumer (dis)saves only a fraction of the new income. The
larger is the interest rate, the larger is the repercussion that this ineﬃcient (dis)saving will have on
her future wealth. Facing a high interest rate, the agent will want to adjust more often to avoid
past mistakes and to keep her assets under control.
The ﬁnal interesting property of inattentiveness is that even very small costs of planning can
lead to considerable inattentiveness.16 The intuition for this result is similar to that in Mankiw
(1985), Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Cochrane (1989). Inattentiveness leads to consumption
15The inattentiveness model suggests a curious explanation for the decline in the U.S. personal savings rate in
the last two decades. If advances in information technology have lowered the costs of obtaining and processing
information, then agents should optimally respond by saving less.
16Further deviations from rationality may magnify this inertia. For instance, if agents have hyperbolic discount
functions, costly planning can lead to procrastination (Akerlof, 1991).
17diﬀering from its full information optimum. However, since the choices of the inattentive consumer
are close to this optimum, this deviation only has a second-order eﬀect on utility. Therefore, even
a second-order cost of planning will induce the agent to tolerate the second-order costs of being
inattentive for a ﬁrst-order period of time.17
Table 1 illustrates how large d∗ can be using diﬀerent parameter estimates. In the ﬁrst column,
are the estimates by Pischke (1995), who measures yP
t as aggregate income and yT
t as idiosyncratic
income. His estimates of aggregate income variability, and of the serial correlation and standard
deviation of income changes imply that σP =$ 4 5 ,φ=0 .487,a n dσT =$ 1 ,962.Is e tt h eq u a r t e r l y
interest rate at 1.5%, approximately its historical value in the United States, and α =2 /6926,
where $6,926 is mean income in the Pischke sample, so the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is
about 2. Equation (25) implies that if the costs of updating plans are just $30, the agent stays
inattentive for over 2 years. Very small costs of planing can lead to considerable inattentiveness.
Column 2 repeats the calculation with r =0 .5%, which may be more appropriate since this is
a riskless rate, while columns 3-5 follow Bound et al. (1994) by lowering the variance of income by
1/3, while changing σP by factors of 0.5, 1.5, and 2. Across these diﬀerent parameter speciﬁcations,
costs of planing between $10 and $50 still lead to 2 years of inattentiveness. Column 6 uses instead
the estimates in Gourinchas and Parker (2002). In this case, a $30 cost of planning leads to slightly
lower inattentiveness at 2.5 quarters, and it takes now a cost of about $80 to induce one year of
inattentiveness. These calculations are solely meant to illustrate how large inattentiveness can be.
They suggest that small costs can generate substantial inattentiveness.18
4.2 Optimal savings and inattentiveness
An inattentive saver sets plans for savings st, subject to the constraint that this choice is conditional
on the information at the last planning date. Appendix D solves for the optimal choices of this
agent, proving the following:
Proposition 7 The CARA-utility, ARMA-income, inattentive saver lives hand-to-mouth following




4(r +2 φ)(r + φ)2.
17Note that the formula in equation (25) is scale-invariant, since K is in income units, σ
2 is in squared units of
income, and α equals scale-free relative risk aversion divided by consumption.
18As discussed at the end of Section 3.1, tractability required allowing consumption to be negative. How often does
this happen? Using the Pischke (1995) parameters and assuming that ρ = r, K = $30,a n dc0 equals 90% of median
income (since the savings rate in the national accounts is about 10%) to infer a value for w0, the probability that cd
is negative is essentially zero: it would take 8 successive quarters of negative wealth shocks equal to more than 10
times their standard deviation for cd to be negative.








= r +2 φ(1 − e−r ˆ d).
The intuition for the ˆ d =+ ∞ result comes from realizing that while consumption reacts opti-
mally (one-to-one) to permanent income shocks, it also responds one-to-one to transitory income
shocks when the optimal reaction would be to consume only a fraction r/(r + φ) of these shocks.
As the costs of planning and optimal inattentiveness rise, less remains of a transitory shock by the
time the agent responds to it. The incentive to update her plans therefore falls as inattentiveness
rises, and a small increase in the costs of planning leads to a large increase in inattentiveness. After
a certain level, optimal inattentiveness becomes convex in the costs of planning, and shoots to
inﬁnity. A person that chooses ˆ d =+ ∞ is a rational non-planer in the sense that she writes a plan
once at time 0 and follows it forever. For the parameter estimates in Pischke (1995), she chooses
to do so once the costs of planning exceed $543.
Rational non-planners not only live hand-to-mouth, but also, as Appendix E shows:
Corollary 3 At time 0, in the CARA-utility, ARMA-income problem, rational non-planners save
less than the consumption planners.
4.3 The choice between consumption and savings plans
Appendix E solves for the inattentive agent’s optimal choice of which type of plan:
Proposition 8 If (φ − r)/(φ + r) >σ 2
P/σ2
T,t h eC A R A - u t i l i t y ,A R M A - i n c o m e ,i n a t t e n t i v ea g e n t
prefers a consumption plan if her costs of planning are below a threshold ˆ K, and a savings plan
otherwise. When the agent shifts from a consumption to savings plans, her inattentiveness rises
discontinuously, and possibly to inﬁnity.
The condition in Proposition 8 likely holds for plausible parameter values. Most studies of individual
income ﬁnd that transitory shocks are the dominant source of income variation, so the condition
i sc l o s et oa s s u m i n gt h a tφ>r . With an annual interest rate of 6%, this requires that transitory
i n c o m es h o c k sh a v eah a l fl i f eo fn om o r et h a n11.5 years. From the other perspective, if φ =0 .487
as estimated by Pischke (1995), the annual interest rate must be lower than 601%.
Proposition 8 shows that the model predicts that there are two distinct groups in the population.
On the one hand, are those who make ﬁnancial plans for consumption, updating them sporadically.
On the other hand, are those who are inattentive for longer, live hand-to-mouth and save less. This
second group may be composed only of people who rationally choose to never plan:
Corollary 4 As long as:
φ3 − r2 (r +2 φ)




19then agents who choose to be inattentive savers also choose to be rational non-planners.
For the parameter estimates of σ2
P/σ2
T and φ found by Pischke (1995), the condition in the corollary
h o l d sa sl o n ga st h ea n n u a li n t e r e s tr a t ei sb e l o w232%.I ti sr e a s o n a b l et oe x p e c tt h a ta l li n a t t e n t i v e
savers are rational non-planners.
A convenient way to assess how likely it is to ﬁnd rational non-planners in the economy is to
use the following result, proven in Appendix E:
Proposition 9 If the conditions in Proposition 8 and Corollary 4 apply, then consumption plans
















While this condition involves an endogenous variable (d∗), it only requires knowledge of σ2
P/σ2
T and
φ from the earnings data, and no information on the degree of risk aversion. Using the benchmark
estimates in Pischke (1995) for σ2
P/σ2
T and φ, then if the agent would choose to be inattentive for
8 quarters under a consumption plan, she prefers this plan to being a rational non-planner as long
as the quarterly real interest rate is below 12.5%. From a diﬀerent perspective, if the quarterly
interest rate is 1.5%, then only if the consumption-planning agent stays inattentive for more than
41 years would she prefer to become a rational non-planner. Some agents may face such high costs
of planning and interest rates that they live hand-to-mouth, but these calculations suggest that the
majority of the population follows consumption plans.
5 Evidence of inattentiveness
5.1 Slow adjustment to shocks, excess sensitivity, and excess smoothness in the
aggregate data
The previous two sections stated a series of predictions of the inattentiveness model for the behavior
of aggregate consumption. I test these using U.S. quarterly time series from 1953:1 to 2002:4 for
aggregate consumption (Ct) measured as real consumption of non-durables and services per capita,
and aggregate income (Yt) measured as real disposable personal income per capita. I will also use
data on real asset returns (rt) using the value-weighted S&P500. All series are deﬂated using the
price deﬂator for consumption of non-durables and services. I measure consumption in logs, since
the series is closer to log-linear than linear. (The predictions in Section 3 could be re-stated in
terms of log consumption by log-linearizing rather than linearizing the Euler equations.)19
19It r i e du s i n gd i ﬀerent consumption series, which exclude services and some components of non-durables that are
arguably durable, and using other measures of returns, on diﬀerent assets and using alternative adjustments for taxes.
The results were robust.
20Proposition 3 stated that the impulse response of consumption to shocks should be increasing
and concave. A simple analysis of the adjustment of aggregate consumption to shocks comes from
estimating a structural vector autoregression (VAR) on consumption and income growth. I set the
lag length on the VAR at 5, as suggested by the use of the Schwartz’s Bayesian information criterion
and by examining the signiﬁcance of the last lag included in the VAR. Following Blanchard and
Quah (1989), I identify the impulse response to permanent shocks to consumption.
Figure 1 displays the impulse response of log consumption to a permanent shock together with
a 90% point-wise conﬁdence interval generated by a bootstrap. Aggregate consumption adjusts
with a delay to the shock, as the inattentiveness model predicts would be the case due to slow
dissemination of information. Moreover, while consumption is sluggish, it is only moderately so:
most of the adjustment is completed within one year of the shock. This is consistent with an
inattentiveness model in which agents update their information approximately once a year. The
concave shape predicted by the model is also visible in Figure 1.
A sharper test of the slow adjustment of consumption to news comes from examining its response
to news on a particularly important variable: income. Given a statistical model for income, surprises
(yt) can be constructed as one-step ahead forecast errors. By construction, these have mean zero
and are uncorrelated, so they satisfy the properties that deﬁne the innovations et in Proposition 2.
Regressing consumption growth on several lags of yt leads to a test of the model’s predictions in
equation (17).
The ﬁrst possible model for income growth I consider is an AR(5). The results from regressing
consumption growth on income news are in Panel A of Table 2. Panel B adds 5 lags of the
log consumption income ratio to predict income. As did Campbell (1987), I ﬁnd that these new
regressors have signiﬁcant predictive power for income growth: the p-value of an F-test on their
signiﬁcance is below 0.1% and the adjusted R2 of the ﬁrst stage regression rises by a factor of 3.
Panel C further adds 5 lags of the real interest rate as predictors of future income growth, though
these variables help very little in forecasting income growth.
The estimates are very similar across the three panels. As predicted by the inattentiveness
model, lagged income surprises aﬀect future consumption growth, with coeﬃcients that are ap-
proximately unchanged across the diﬀerent panels. The F-statistic reported in the Table tests the
null hypothesis of the Hall (1978) model that lagged income surprises do not aﬀect current con-
sumption growth. This hypothesis is always strongly rejected at signiﬁcance levels above 0.1%.
Moreover, income surprises explain much of the variability of consumption growth; the adjusted
R2 of the regression is between 0.23 and 0.33. Estimating a regression by least squares subject
to the model’s restriction that the coeﬃcients on income surprises s periods ago are declining in
s produces the restricted estimates presented in the Table. These restricted estimates are quite
close to the unrestricted estimates supporting the validity of the model’s restrictions. The null
hypothesis of the model can be formally tested using Wolak’s (1989) Wald test. In Table 2, WIN
displays the value of the test statistic and the p-value of the test of the inattentiveness null. The
21model cannot be rejected at statistical signiﬁcance level below 37%.20
Figure 2 displays graphically these results. Since the estimates are so similar across panels, I
display only the results in Panel B. The top panel of the Figure plots ˆ Φ(j)/
PI+1
i=0 ˆ Φ(i) for j from
0 to I +1 , together with 95% conﬁdence intervals. The inattentiveness model predicts a declining
sequence of non-negative points, and this is consistent with the plot. In the bottom panel, I plot
instead the cumulative dissemination of the news. It shows the increasing and concave shape that
the model predicts, similar to that estimated earlier in Figure 1.
Proposition 4 makes sharp predictions on the shape of the power spectrum of aggregate con-
sumption changes. Figure 3 plots estimates of the spectrum, constructed using a sample spectral
density weighted over a 5-lag Bartlett window. Figure 3 also displays the spectrum for aggregate
consumption growth predicted by the inattentiveness model using the weights ˆ Φ(i) estimated in
panel B of Table 2. The predicted spectrum matches the empirical spectrum well, despite somewhat
more pronounced swings, and the ﬁt is especially good using the theory-restricted estimates.
Table 3 displays diﬀerent estimates of the excess smoothness ratio ψ. They lie between 0.52 and
0.7, and the full information rational expectations null hypothesis that they equal one is always
rejected. The inattentiveness model using the weights estimated in Table 2 predicts an excess
smoothness ratio between 0.47 and 0.66, well within what we observe in the data (or slightly
below). The inattentiveness model is therefore able to simultaneously generate the extent of excess
sensitivity and excess smoothness that we observe in the data.
5.2 The share of inattentive savers and inattentiveness versus Campbell-Mankiw
Proposition 5 stated that regressing consumption growth on income growth, instrumenting with
variables lagged I +1p e r i o d sw i l lg i v ea ne s t i m a t eo ft h es h a r eo fi n c o m ea t t r i b u t e dt oi n a t t e n t i v e
savers. Table 4 presents these estimates, computed using as instruments for the change in income
variables dated at least 9 quarters before. The estimates in Section 5.1 suggested that within one
year most agents have updated their plans, so letting I be 2 years is a conservative choice. Since
the model predicts that the residuals of this regression should be serially correlated, I compute the
Hayashi and Sims (1984) nearly-eﬃcient estimates, rather than the conventional (but ineﬃcient)
two-stage least squares estimates.
The estimates of λ are quite low, between 0.05 and 0.15, and the null hypothesis that λ =0can
never be rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels. This conﬁrms the prediction in Section 4.3
that the share of aggregate consumption attributable to hand-to-mouth behavior should be small,
with the bulk of aggregate consumption dynamics accounted for by inattentive consumers.
The instruments used in these regressions are weak though, as reﬂected by the low F-statistics:
income growth is diﬃcult to forecast 9 quarters in advance. With weak instruments, the IV esti-
20Mishkin (1983) noted that the two-step econometric procedure that I used will not produce eﬃcient estimates.
I have estimated the system of two equations simultaneously using the iterative procedure suggested by Mishkin
(1983). The results were very similar to those in Table 2, so the inferences are robust to this econometric issue.
22mates are biased towards the OLS estimates, so I report these in Panel B. Since the OLS estimates
are higher than the IV estimates, the estimates of λ in Panel A are, if anything, too large. An
alternative estimator is the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator, and the
third column shows that these estimates are slightly lower than those in Panel A. Columns 4 to 6 of
Panel B present three diﬀerent tests proposed in the literature on weak instruments to powerfully
test the hypothesis that λ =0 : none of them rejects this hypothesis. While these tests likely suﬀer
from lack of power, note that both the IV and the LIML estimates are consistent (and the tests
of the over-identifying restrictions implied by instrument validity are never rejected), and they
consistently estimate λ to be small.
Equation (21) also describes aggregate consumption dynamics in the model proposed by Camp-
bell and Mankiw (1989, 1990), in which a fraction 1−λ of consumption is accounted for by rational
expectations agents, while the remaining λ fraction is accounted for by irrational, myopic, hand-
to-mouth people. The diﬀerence is that in their model, Φ(i)=0for i ≥ 1. Using variables lagged
two quarters as instruments for income growth, Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990) found that
hand-to-mouth agents account for 40 − 50% of aggregate consumption. According to their model
though, it is equally valid to use instruments lagged nine quarters. However, Table 4 shows that
doing so produces estimates of λ that are insigniﬁcant and much lower, between 5% and 15%,
supporting instead the inattentiveness model.
It would be desirable to test the Campbell-Mankiw model against the inattentiveness model,
having both stated as null hypotheses in order to ensure that lack of power does not bias the results
in favour of the model that is stated as a null hypothesis. Note that Yt+1−Yt can be written instead
as (Et − Et−1)(Yt+1 − Yt)+( Et−1 − Et−2)(Yt+1 − Yt)+... + Et−T(Yt+1 − Yt)+( Yt+1 − EtY t+1).
Equation (21) can therefore instead be written in the form:
Ct+1 − Ct = β0 +
T X
s=1
βs (Et−s+1 − Et−s)(Yt+1 − Yt)+λEt−T(Yt+1 − Yt)+ut+1, (30)
In terms of this regression equation, the null hypothesis describing the Campbell-Mankiw model
is21
HCM
0 : β2 = ... = βT = λ.
Since (Et−s+1 − Et−s)(Yt+1 −Yt) has a zero expectation as of t−s, it ﬁts into the deﬁnition of the
news et−s+1, so the prediction of the inattentiveness model is that
HING
0 : β1 ≥ β2 ≥ ... ≥ βT ≥ 0,
as long as T ≥ I +1 ,a n dt h ee s t i m a t eo fλ gives the share of inattentive savers. If there are only
21There is no restriction on β1 because of time aggregation, and I do not impose the restriction λ ≥ 0,w h i c hm a y
bias the results in favor of the Campbell-Mankiw model.
23inattentive consumers this leads to the stronger null hypothesis:
HING
0 : β1 ≥ β2 ≥ ... ≥ βT ≥ 0,λ =0 .
Finally, the Hall (1978) model predicts that
HRE
0 : β2 = ... = βT = λ =0 ,
so that no lagged variables predict future consumption growth. Intuitively, the diﬀerence between
the Campbell-Mankiw and the inattentiveness models is that in the former, consumption depends
on lagged income news solely through hand-to-mouth consumption, so how far away in the past the
news was revealed does not aﬀect its impact. With inattentiveness instead the longer the news has
been known for, the more likely it is that agents have since updated their plans and so the smaller
their current impact.
I generated the regressors in (30) using the forecasts of income growth from a VAR with 5 lags
on the change in log income, the log consumption-income ratio, and the real interest rate. Table 5
presents the point estimates of equation (30). They are somewhat discouraging for all four models
since they do not seem to have the pattern described in either HCM
0 or HIN
0 , and several of them
are individually large and statistically signiﬁcant contrary to HRE
0 . Panel B of Table 5 formally
tests the models using Wald tests for HCM
0 , HRE
0 , HIN
0 ,a n dHING
0 . Consistent with the other
results in this paper, the full information rational expectations model is decisively rejected even
at a 0.01% signiﬁcance level. The Campbell-Mankiw model is also rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance
level (but not at the 1% level), which is not surprising given the low estimate of λ.T h e n u l l
hypothesis of the general inattentiveness model on the other hand has a p-value of 12.8%, so it is
not statistically rejected at conventional signiﬁcance levels. Moreover, note that it is estimated that
only 3.4% of consumption is done by inattentive savers, so hand-to-mouth behavior is economically
and statistically insigniﬁcant. Consequently, the model with inattentive consumers alone is not
statistically rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
These results suggest that the hand-to-mouth behavior detected in aggregate consumption data
may be attributable to inattentiveness rather than to the model proposed by Campbell and Mankiw
(1990). Moreover, as predicted by the theory, rational non-planning seems to have a small impact
on aggregate consumption.
5.3 Inattentiveness versus habits
A popular alternative theory of consumption has stressed that consumers may develop habits
over consumption, in which case they have a preference for sluggish consumption adjustments
(e.g., Fuhrer, 2000). In the simplest case (see Deaton, 1992, pp. 31-33) this model implies that
consumption growth will be an AR(1) process, with the AR coeﬃcient equal to the preference
parameter determining the habit. Since an AR(1) is also an MA(∞) with declining coeﬃcients a
24model with a representative consumer with a habit generates aggregate consumption observations
close to the MA(I +1 )with declining coeﬃcients predicted by the inattentiveness model. One
can see the inattentiveness model as providing a “micro-foundation” for a representative consumer
with a habit.22
Using other information aside from the stochastic process describing consumption, the mod-
els can be distinguished in several ways. For instance, since in the habit model sluggishness of
consumption is a result of preferences, then this sluggishness should be constant across diﬀerent
periods in time. In the inattentiveness model on the other hand, slow adjustment is a result of
inattentiveness, and this is optimally chosen by agents in response to, among other things, the
volatility of income. If the volatility of disposable income fell, the model predicts that agents would
respond by staying inattentive for longer, so that consumption should adjust more sluggishly to
shocks. Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) identify a large fall in the
volatility of U.S. GDP after around 1984. Figure 4 repeats the calculations behind Figures 1 and
2, but now splitting the sample between before 1982 and after 1985. The model predicts that the
latter period should show a more sluggish response to shocks, and this is what we observe.
Likewise, the representative consumer habit model predicts that consumption should respond
sluggishly to any event. The inattentiveness model on the other hand predicts that consumption
moves sluggish with respect to events towards which people are inattentive. It is reasonable to
suppose that people become aware of extreme, very noticeable events, in which case, consump-
tion should respond instantly.23 One notable such event is the end of hyper- and high-inﬂations,
which usually occurs suddenly with the implementation of drastic and well-publicized stabilization
programs. Fischer et al. (2002) examine 45 such episodes in 25 countries since 1960. They ﬁnd
that these noticeable disinﬂation programs have a large eﬀect on real variables, and especially that
aggregate consumption responds immediately, consistently with the inattentiveness model but not
with the habit model.
Another approach to distinguishing inattentiveness form habits is to look at individual data.
Inattentiveness implies that individual consumption adjusts infrequently, so that all the sluggishness
in aggregate consumption comes from aggregation, whereas habit formation predicts that individual
consumption is serially correlated. Dynan (2002) uses data from the PSID to ﬁnd that individual
consumption growth is close to serially uncorrelated. Therefore, when she estimates the optimality
conditions imposed by the habit model she ﬁnds no evidence for habits. Her ﬁndings are consistent
with inattentiveness.
22With more ﬂexible speciﬁcations of habits, the match between the two models may be even closer. Chetty and
Szeidl (2003) show that, under some circumstances, a model with time-contingent consumption adjustment exactly
mimics the aggregate consumption dynamics that would be chosen by a representative agent with a speciﬁch a b i t
formation process.
23Section 6 incorporates these extraordinary events in the model.
255.4 Inattentiveness versus state-contingent adjustment and the micro evidence
on inattention, slow dissemination of information, and planning
Caballero (1995) proposes a model of non-durables consumption in which it is costless to obtain,
acquire, and process information, but it is costly to implement the optimal consumption plan.
Consumers are always attentive, but only decide to adjust consumption at sporadic dates contingent
on the current state of the economy. Consumption adjustment is now state-contingent.
Since both models imply a disconnect between available information and observed actions,
given data on these two alone, it will generally be diﬃcult to distinguish the two models. One
way to contrast the models is over the empirical realism of their assumptions. I have argued that
it is costly to collect and process information and to compute an optimal solution. With state
contingent adjustment though, every instant the agent is observing the full state of the economy,
is processing this information to realize what is her wealth, and is performing costly computations
to determine whether it should adjust consumption. State-contingent behavior is as complicated
as following the full information rational expectations optimal plan, so it cannot be justiﬁed as
describing “near-rational” behavior. Rather, behind this model there must be some actual physical
cost of adjusting consumption. It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd evidence for this cost in the consumption of
non-durables.
There is an alternative way to compare state-contingent adjustment with inattentiveness though.
It consists of looking at an intermediate step in the disconnect between publicly available infor-
mation and observed actions: the information that agents have. According to the inattentiveness
model, agent’s private information, expectations and future plans are only sporadically updated,
whereas in the state-contingent model private and public information coincide at all instants.
There is much evidence that people are inattentive, but one is particularly relevant to the model
in this paper. In 1992, President George H. Bush announced a reduction in the standard rates of
withholding for income taxes, which lowered employees’ tax withholding by about $29 per month.
Using a survey of 501 people, 1-2 months after the announcement, Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) ﬁnd
that about half of the respondents were not aware of any change in withholding, and as many as
2/3 did not know whether withholding rates had increased or fallen.
The inattentiveness model further predicts that news disseminates slowly throughout the pop-
ulation. Carroll (2003) and Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) use survey data on inﬂation expec-
tations to test this prediction. Carroll (2003) ﬁnds that the expectations of the public lag those of
professional forecasters and that when newspapers mention inﬂation more often, the public updates
its expectations faster, consistent with an optimal choice of inattentiveness. Mankiw, Reis, and
Wolfers (2003) ﬁnd that a model with exogenous staggered updating of information matches the
time-series of disagreement about expected inﬂation in the data well, and can explain the particu-
larly large increase in disagreement that occurred in the early 1980s during the Volcker disinﬂation.
A separate piece of evidence supporting the inattentiveness model comes from recent empirical
work on planning behavior. The inattentiveness model predicts that a fraction of the population
26choose to never make plans and save less than those who do. Lusardi (1999, 2002) ﬁnds that in
the sample of people over 50 years old in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), approximately
one third have hardly thought about retirement. She ﬁnds that those who have not planned are
more likely to be less educated, self-report lower cognitive abilities, be single, and do not have
older siblings to use as a source of information. Using these proxies of the costs of planning as
instruments, she ﬁnds that planning strongly predicts accumulated wealth. Ameriks, Caplin and
Leahy (2003a) perform a similar exercise in a sample of TIAA-CREF members, asking people
whether they write ﬁnancial plans, and using as measures of the costs of planning whether they
are conﬁdent with their mathematical skills, and whether they usually plan their vacations. They
ﬁnd that approximately 25% of households report not having a ﬁnancial plan, and that those who
do not plan have signiﬁcantly lower savings and accumulated wealth.
In addition, in their survey, Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003a) also asked those with plans, for
how long they have had their plan in place. The inattentiveness model predicts that planners who
update less frequently will save less. Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003a) support this prediction as
they ﬁnd that people who have had plans in place for longer accumulate signiﬁcantly more wealth.
In related work, Alessie, Kapteyn, and Lusardi (1999) use the Dutch CentER data-panel, and ﬁnd
that the longer is people’s reported planning horizon, the larger are their savings, though the eﬀect
is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, Hurst (2003) uses data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to ﬁnd that
people that reach retirement with low wealth, also have a larger drop in consumption at retirement
(consistent with inadequate planning for retirement), and earlier in life had consumption growth
responding to predictable changes in income. Moreover, he ﬁnds that this behavior cannot be ac-
counted for by liquidity constraints, precautionary savings, or habit formation, but can be explained
by hand-to-mouth behavior. The identiﬁcation of a group in the population that simultaneously
does not plan, saves less, and lives hand-to-mouth, supports the model in this paper.
This evidence that, when asked, people report being unaware of important current economic
events; that individual expectations are consistent with slow dissemination of information; that
reported planning behavior is a determinant of accumulated wealth; and that there is a group in the
population that does not plan, saves little, and lives hand-to-mouth, all support the inattentiveness
model, but would not be predicted by a state-contingent adjustment model.
5.5 Inattentiveness and excess sensitivity at the micro level
There have been many tests of excess sensitivity using individual consumption data but the results
so far are inconclusive: some studies ﬁnd it, while others do not, and it is unclear what explains
the diﬀerent results. The inattentiveness model suggests an explanation. The model predicts that
people are inattentive to ordinary unpredictable events and thus react with a delay to these shocks,
only at their next planning date. If the event is easily predictable though, the agents will have
r e a c t e dt oi tw h e nt h e ys e tt h e i rp l a n si nt h ep a s t .Likewise, if the event is extraordinary in the
27sense of capturing people’s attention (as will be formalized in section 6), the model also predicts
an instantaneous reaction.
Two key papers that have found evidence that small past news on after-tax income aﬀects
consumption some time after are Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999). Parker (1999) looks at the
patterns of Social Security tax withholding, while Souleles (1999) looks at income tax refunds. In
both cases, the news were to ordinary components of income and were not especially noticeable
and they were also unpredictable. Parker and Souleles ﬁndings that consumption is sensitive to
these past news supports the inattentiveness model.
In turn, Browning and Collado (2001) and Souleles (2000) look at the response of consumption
to large and easily predictable changes in income, and ﬁnd that consumption does not react to
these past news. Browning and Collado (2001) examine the reaction of Spanish households to well-
known income ﬂuctuations driven by the timing of bonus payments, while Souleles (2000) examines
the impact of the easily predicted college tuition payments on parent’s consumption. Hsieh (2003)
studies the reaction of Alaskans to the extraordinary payments made to them by the Alaska’s
Permanent Fund associated with oil royalties. These payments were very large (on average $1,964
in 2000), infrequent, and amply discussed in the media. Hsieh (2003) ﬁnds that consumption does
not respond to this past extraordinary news, supporting the inattentiveness model.
The inattentiveness model can therefore reconcile the apparently contradictory ﬁndings in the
literature that has tested for excess sensitivity to past events.
5.6 Possible new tests of inattentiveness
The inattentiveness model makes a series of sharp predictions on the behavior of individual con-
sumption. The discussion so far shows that these predictions are consistent with a wide set of
known facts about individual behavior.
The model also generates many novel predictions that can be tested using micro data. For
instance, the model predicts that the longer it takes from the announcement of an income shocks to
its realization, then the smaller should be a cross-sectional estimate of the response of consumption
to the shock when it is realized. An alternative test of the model would be to use information
that at some point in time (e.g., at tax-ﬁling dates) some agents are more likely to be paying
attention to their income than others (e.g., those that ﬁll their fax forms on their own vs. those
that use a tax-preparer), and see whether those that are inattentive are more likely to respond to
the available information with a delay (e.g., change consumption when the income tax refund check
arrives). Yet a third alternative could examine whether shocks that are common to all individuals
raise the dispersion of consumption over households, as some react to it and others do not. These,
and other tests, are beyond the scope of this already long paper, but hopefully can be undertaken
in future work.
286E x t e n s i o n s
The main assumption behind the model is that it is costly to acquire, absorb, and process infor-
mation. One might argue though that surely people observe some things, namely their income
or the amount in their bank account. However, understanding what this information implies for
their wealth, which includes forecasts of the entire path of future income, as well as ﬁguring out
the other relevant state variables that should guide people’s optimal actions, are likely not easy
and quite costly. Moreover, it is also not costless to be able to write down a mapping from these
state variables to the person’s choices, which include not just the cost of solving an often diﬃcult
optimization problem, but also the cost of discussing within the household what is the best course
of action. Therefore, even if the costs of acquiring information may be small, the costs of absorbing
and processing this information may be quite substantial.
6.1 Extraordinary events
There are some extraordinary circumstances though, that people likely keep an eye on. For most of
the time in her ordinary life, a person is subject to random but small income shocks so it is not too
costly to be inattentive. Occasionally though, big things happen in your life. You may lose your
job, or win the lottery; your close family may be struck by a serious and expensive disease, or you
may receive a sudden inheritance from a distant relative; an unexpected hyperinﬂation may eat
up your purchasing power, or the shares in your small company may be worth a fortune after you
come across a great invention. These things make you stop and think: the circumstances around
you have changed so radically that old plans must be thrown out of the window and new plans
made for the future.
A simple way to model these extraordinary events is by adding to the agent’s income an in-
dependent Poisson term with arrival rate δ and jumps u or −u with equal probability. Most of
t h et i m e( w i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1 − δ) no event takes place, but every so often (with probability δ)
an extraordinary event occurs which dramatically changes the person’s disposable income and to
which she responds instantly. Because most of the time no event occurs, the computational cost of
observing this variable is small so this is consistent with the underlying assumption that there are
costs of absorbing and processing information. As long as the event is extraordinary (i.e., u> >0),
the agent responds to it by collecting information and setting a new plan.
Appendix F solves the problem of an inattentive consumer with CARA utility and the income
process in section 4, including these extraordinary events. (A similar calculation could be performed
for the inattentive savers.) Under the convenient but inessential assumption that r = ρ,o p t i m a l
inattentiveness minimizes the function A(0), which solves the boundary value diﬀerential equation:














29This diﬀerential equation can be solved numerically to ﬁnd d∗. Panel A of Table 6 does so using the
parameter estimates from Pischke (1995) in the cases when extraordinary events occur on average
every 2, 5, or 10 years, and when they imply a change in income of $500, $2500, and $5000. Panel
B shows the probability that an extraordinary event occurs before the planning time arrives.
Table 6 shows that the larger is the size of the extraordinary event, the longer is inattentiveness.
I hold the agent’s total income variance constant over the diﬀerent parameters, so as u rises, a
larger share of the variance is accounted for by extraordinary events. The variance of the small
income shocks to which the agent is inattentive is then lower, so she stays inattentive for longer.
Extraordinary events have a modest eﬀect for these parameter values, at most raising inattentiveness
by 3 quarters. Note also that as extraordinary events become more infrequent, the planning horizon
approaches the solution without extraordinary events. If an extraordinary event occurs on average
every 10 years, then the agent who stays inattentive for 2-year periods will adjust before the end
of her plan only about 18% of the time.
6.2 Hybrid plans
In the United States, many workers enroll in ﬁxed percentage contribution IRA plans, which every
month save a ﬁxed percentage of their income for retirement. The economy has provided a mech-
anism that saves people the cost of observing their income and deciding how much to save, by
automatically saving a constant fraction every period.
With these hybrid consumption-savings plans, ct = θyt +˜ ct and at a planning date, the agent
now sets a plan for consumption (˜ ct), for the next planning date (˜ d), as well as for the fraction of
income shocks so be absorbed by consumption (θ). Appendix G solves the problem of this hybrid
consumption-savings planner, with CARA utility and ARMA income. The optimal ˜ d and θ are
state-independent, and Table 7 displays them for diﬀerent plausible values of the interest rate and
the costs of planning. The ability to choose θ implies that relative to consumption-planning the
agent is now inattentive for even longer. The optimal θ in turn are quite small, ranging from 0.02
to 0.19. Note that a world with hybrid planners would on aggregate be similar to a world partially
populated by consumption and savings planners. Moreover, in both cases, the theory predicts that
wither θ or λ should be quite small, which matches the empirical ﬁndings reported in section 5.2.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In his Nobel lecture, James Tobin (1982, page 189) wrote:
“Some decisions by economic agents are reconsidered daily or hourly, while others are reviewed
at intervals of a year or longer except when extraordinary events compel revisions. It would be
desirable in principle to allow for diﬀerences among variables in frequencies of change and even to
make these frequencies endogenous. But at present, models of such realism seem beyond the power
of our analytical tools.”
30In this paper, I developed some of the tools that Tobin called for and examined the implications
of modelling behavior in this way for the dynamics of aggregate consumption. I assumed (and
justiﬁed) the existence of decision costs inducing agents to only sporadically update their decisions
and characterized the decisions of these agents on how much to consume and how often to plan.
This individual behavior implies that information should be sticky in the aggregate economy, only
gradually dissipating throughout the population, so that aggregate consumption adjusts slowly to
the arrival of news. I found that this prediction is conﬁrmed in U.S. data and that the model
also generates dynamics for aggregate consumption which have the “excess sensitivity” and “excess
smoothness” with respect to income that had been previously identiﬁed in the data. For individual
consumption, the model predicted that consumption changes should be sensitive to small and
unpredictable past shocks, but should not be sensitive to past large or predictable changes. This
dichotomy reconciles the disparate ﬁndings of the many microeconomic studies which have studied
the excess sensitivity of consumption to shocks. The model further predicted that information and
expectations are only sporadically updated, which has also been shown to be the case using inﬂation
expectations surveys. Finally, the model predicted that a group of people do not plan and save less
than those who plan, and that among planners, those who plan for longer, save more. Again, this
has been conﬁrmed in the data.
Beyond passing tests in the data, the set of theoretical results and empirical estimates in this
paper oﬀer a plausible description of consumption behavior. There are two types of agents in
the United States. About one third of people face high costs of planning (e.g., because of lack
of education) and so rationally choose to never plan, living hand-to-mouth and consuming their
income less a predetermined amount every period. These people save less and accumulate less
wealth. Because they are poorer, they account for only a small fraction of aggregate consumption,
around 5%. The bulk of aggregate consumption is accounted for instead by the other two thirds
of people who form plans for consumption regularly. Because they only sporadically update their
plans, these people react to small unexpected income shocks only gradually over time. Aggregate
consumption therefore reacts sluggishly to shocks, but not too sluggishly since people do update
their plans within a year or so.
Because the model in this paper is a model of how dynamic decisions are made and expectations
are formed, in principle it is widely applicable to diﬀerent economic problems. Decisions on how
much to invest in stocks or bonds, how often to change prices or revise contracts are some to which
the inattentiveness approach can be applied. While it is diﬃcult to know for sure how successful
these applications will be, there is enough promise to justify paying some attention to inattention.
31Appendix A - The discrete-time representation of consumption
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Treating the vector (i,j) as a random variable with distribution Ψ(i,j), equation (17) shows
that (up to a constant), aggregate consumption growth is the expected value of et+1−j,t−i. Because
(i,j) can only take ﬁnitely many values, it is a simple random variable (Billingsley, 1995, Section
5) so the integrals in (17) are Riemann integrals and can be represented as sums. Breaking each
unit interval into N parts, j takes N equidistant values from 0 to 1 − 1/N and i takes IN +1







Recall that et,t−s is a random variable such that Et−s [et,t−s]=0 . It can be broken into
independent increments by writing: et,t−s =
R t
t−s ε(v)dv,w h e r eε(v) is a continuous time “white












































T h el a s te x p r e s s i o nu s e sPj(.) to denote the marginal distribution of j, Pj(k/N)=
PNI
m=0 Ψ(m/N,k/N),
as well as Pi(.) to denote the marginal distribution over the i, Pi(m/N)=
PN−1
k=0 Ψ(m/N,k/N)).

















































24More rigorously, ε(v)dv = ζ(dv),w h e r eζ(dv) i sar a n d o mm e a s u r ed e ﬁned on all subsets of the real line such
that E[ζ(dv)] = 0,E [ζ(dv)
2]=σ
2dv, and E[ζ(∆1)ζ(∆2)] = 0 for any disjoint sets ∆1 and ∆2 (Rozanov, 1967).
















where I deﬁned Gj(k) ≡
Pk
p=0 Pj(p/N), which is increasing in k;a n dGi(m) ≡
PNI
p=m Pi(p/N),










where F(k)=Gj(k) for k =0 ,...,N − 1,w h i l eF(k)=Gi(k − N) for k = N,...,N(I +1 )− 1.
Clearly, Es−1/N [us]=0and E [usuk]=0 ,w h i l eF(k) is increasing from k =0to N − 1,a n d
decreasing from N to N(I +1 )− 1.









= Φ(0)et+1 + Φ(1)et + ... + Φ(I)et−I+1,
deﬁning : Φ(s) ≡











Clearly, Et−s [et+1−s]=0and Va r[et+1−s]=σ2
ε.M o r e o v e r , s i n c e F(k) is decreasing for k ≥ N,
then Φ(s) is also decreasing for s =1 ,2...,I, which completes the proof of the Proposition.¤
Time Aggregation
Using the sum representation of the Riemann integral, we observe:








































This can then be written in discrete time as:
∆ ¯ Ct+1 = ¯ Φ(0)et+1 + ¯ Φ(1)et + ... + ¯ Φ(I)et−I+1 + ¯ Φ(I +1 ) et−I,
¯ Φ(s) ≡
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






















p=NI F(p)2, for s = I +1
Time aggregation therefore turns an MA(I) process into an MA(I+1). The non-increasing pattern
of the ¯ Φ(i) is unaltered, and applies up to I +1 .
Appendix B - Spectrum of consumption
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4







where γj = E (∆Ct − E(∆Ct))(∆Ct−j − E(∆Ct)),t h ejth autocovariance of ∆Ct. The normalized
power spectrum is f∆C(ω)=h∆C(ω)/V ar(∆C).
Recall four results: (a) De Moivre’s formula, e−iωj =c o s ( ωj) − i · sin(ωj),( b )sin(−ωj)=
−sin(ωj),( c )cos(ωj)=c o s ( −ωj), and (d) that since the MA(I) process in equation (17) is sta-















k=0 Φ(k)Φ(k + j),f o rj =0 ,1,2,...,I
0,f o rj>I
Replacing this into (33) and dividing by γ0, gives the expression in Proposition 5, which depends
only on {Φ(i)/Φ(0)} for i from 1 to I. Evaluating (18) at frequency zero and rearranging gives the
34excess smoothness ratio in (19).¤
Appendix C - CARA-utility, ARMA-income, consumer problem
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6







Using this to substitute out ct in the budget constraint (24), a little algebra shows that wealth at





















































Next, I make the (educated) guess that the value function is exponential: V (w)=−Aexp(−Bw),
where A and B are coeﬃcients to be determined. The envelope theorem condition implies that:






Since w0 is normally distributed, from the properties of the log-normal distribution, ln[E [exp(−Bw0)]]
equals −BE[w0]+B2Va r[w0]/2. Using this result and (35)-(36) in (37), gives the solution for c∗
0:
c∗



















The marginal utility of consumption equals the marginal value of assets:
e−αc∗
0 = ABe−Bw. (39)
If the guess of the value function is valid, (39) must hold for all possible realizations of w.M a t c h i n g
coeﬃcients shows that B = αr. Going back to (38) with this result gives:
c∗











The last optimality condition is the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to d,w h i c hi sj u s t :
35∂V(w)/∂d =0 . Given the guess for the value function,









the ﬁrst-order condition is just ∂c∗





Solving this equation gives (25). Using the solution for d∗ in (40) gives the solution for c∗
0 in (27).¤
Appendix D - The inattentive saver’s problem
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7






e−ρtu(yt − st)dt + e−ρdW(w0)
¸
(42)
s.t. dat =( rat + st)dt (43)
Integrating (43) between two decision dates, using the fact that w0 = wd−K,t h a tyt = yP
t +yT
t ,
and the deﬁnition wt = at + yP
t /r + yT

















Since permanent income follows a Brownian motion, yP0
is normally distributed with mean yP
and variance σ2
Pd.L i k e w i s e , s i n c e dyT
t = −φyT
t dt + σTdzT
t , then transitory income is normally
distributed with mean yT exp(−φd) and variance σ2







































, for t ∈ [0,d). (46)












36Using the normality of yt, it takes a few steps to obtain:














.( 4 7 )






Again, I guess that the value function is exponential: W(w)=−Ae−αrw,w h e r eA is a coeﬃcient to
be determined. Taking logs of (48), and using the properties of the log-normal distribution together
with (44)-(45) gives leads to:




















4φ(r + φ)2 .
Using the solution for st in (47) to substitute out savings in this equation gives, after rearranging,:

















4(r +2 φ)(r + φ)2(erd − 1)
(49)
Combining the envelope theorem (48) with (46) gives the condition:
u0(y0 − s0)=Ww(w).
Using the form of the utility function, the guess for the value function, and the expression for s0






















4(r +2 φ)(r + φ)2(erd − 1)
¾
. (50)
Given (50) and the guess for the value function, to maximize W(w) with respect to d is equivalent






T(1 − e−2φˆ d)
4(r +2 φ)(r + φ)2(er ˆ d − 1)
. (51)










37where : Ξ ≡




If KΞ > 1, B(d) is always negative, which implies that ˆ A falls monotonically with d,a n ds ot h e
optimal ˆ d is +∞. Otherwise, ˆ d is the zero of B(d). Straightforward evaluation and diﬀerentiation
of B(d) shows that with strictly positive costs of planning: B(0) < 0, Bd(0) < 0, Bdd(.) > 0,
and limd→+∞ B(D)=+ ∞. Thus, there is a unique solution to B(d)=0 ,w h e r eB(d) cuts the
horizontal axis from below, and therefore there is a unique optimal ˆ d.¤
Appendix E - Consumption versus savings plans
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8
The agent prefers a consumption plan if the value from doing so V (w) is larger than the value
from following a savings plan W(w). It is easy to see that V (w)=−exp(−αc∗
0)/αr,w h i l eW(w)
is in (50). The condition V (w) >W(w) then becomes:
H(K) ≡
rK
er ˆ d − 1
−
αrφσ2
T(1 − e−2φˆ d)






2(r +2 φ)(r + φ)2 > 0.
If K =0 ,t h e nˆ d =0and using L’Hopital’sr u l ei tf o l l o w st h a tH(0) = 0: under full information
rational expectations, consumption and savings plans are equivalent. Moreover, when K>1/Ξ
and so ˆ d =+ ∞, then the ﬁr s tt w ot e r m si nt h ed e ﬁnition of H(K) are zero, so clearly H(K) is
declining in K tending towards minus inﬁnity. More generally, using the envelope theorem:
HK(.)=
r












where the second equality follows from (41). Then, sign{HK(.)} = sign
n
d∗ − ˆ d
o
,s oIm u s t
compare optimal inattentiveness with consumption and savings plans.
Evaluating the function B(d) deﬁned in (52), whose zero is the optimal inattentiveness with











− 2φ − r.
Since I know that if B(d) is negative it is to the left of its zero, and when it is positive it is to
the right of its zero, then when F(d∗) is positive it follows that d∗ > ˆ d. Conversely when F(d∗) is
negative, then d∗ < ˆ d, and at ˆ d, F(ˆ d)=0 .
Straightforward evaluation and diﬀerentiation of F(.) shows that: F(0) = 0, Fd(0) = 0,a n d
Fdd(0) = 2rφ(2φ + r) − r3Ξασ2/2.U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnition of Ξ in (53) shows that if the assumption
in Proposition 8 holds, then Fdd(0) > 0.T h u s ,c l o s et o0, F(.) is positive and so d∗ > ˆ d.
Next, I will show that aside from the trivial intersection at 0, d∗ = ˆ d only once. Note that the
38derivative of F(.) at a point of intersection is:














er ˆ d − 1
´
2
− 2φre−r ˆ d
=2 φ
³





er ˆ d − 1
´
2
− 2φre−r ˆ d
=2 φ(r +2 φ)
³







where the second line follows from replacing the ﬁrst term using the condition F(ˆ d)=0 ,a n dt h e
third line follows from rearranging. Then, it is clear that if ˆ d is small enough, Fd(ˆ d) is positive,
but once ˆ d rises above a certain threshold, it becomes negative forever. Now, since for small K,
F(d∗) is positive, this continuous function must intersect the horizontal axis ﬁr s ta tap o i n tw h e r e
Fd(ˆ d) < 0. Towards a contradiction, say that is intersects the horizontal axis again at some higher
d.B yc o n t i n u i t yo ft h eF(d) function, it must cut the axis from below. Yet, we know that at any
zero of the F(d) function the slope must be negative, which leads to a contradiction. Therefore,
d∗ = ˆ d only once at some value of K, and if the costs of planning exceed this value then ˆ d>d ∗.
Returning back to the initial aim of studying H(.) I conclude that starting from 0 when K =0 ,
the function increases up to a certain K (when d∗ = ˆ d). Then it declines monotonically towards
minus inﬁnity, intersecting the horizontal axis at a unique point ˆ K.T h e r e f o r e ,i fK ∈ (0, ˆ K),t h e n
H(K) > 0, so consumption plans are preferred. If K>ˆ K, savings plans are preferred.
Finally, note that at ˆ K where H( ˆ K)=0 , we know that HK( ˆ K) < 0,a n ds ot h a tˆ d>d ∗;t h e r e -
fore when K passes ˆ K and the agent shifts from consumption to savings plans, her inattentiveness
takes a discontinuous jump from d∗ to ˆ d.¤
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y4
If K>1/Ξ,t h e nˆ d =+ ∞. Also, consumption plans are preferred as long as H(K) > 0,w h i c h











Moreover, if K>ˆ K, then savings plans are preferred. Combining these three facts, it follows that
if ¯ K>1/Ξ,t h e n ˆ K = ¯ K.U s i n gt h ed e ﬁnitions of ¯ K and Ξ, the condition ¯ K>1/Ξ becomes the
condition in Corollary 4.¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9














Using the solution for c∗























Using (41) to replace for K and rearranging gives the condition in (29).¤
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y3
Using the fact that ˆ c0 = y0 − ˆ s0 and (49) with ˆ d =+ ∞,s h o w st h a t :
















Then, for ˆ s0 <s ∗
0,i tm u s tb et h a tˆ c0 >c ∗
0, which using the expressions above is equivalent to
condition (54) holding, which is true for the agent who chooses to be an inattentive saver.¤
Appendix F - Extraordinary events




























. Then, if I deﬁne ¯ wt = wt − εt, the
law of motion for wt implies that d ¯ wt =( r ¯ wt − ct)dt.
Denote the value function in terms of ¯ wD+t, and in terms of how long has elapsed since the last
planning date t by J(¯ wD+t,t). This is an optimal stopping problem. The Bellman equation is:





E0 [J(¯ wD+d + εD+d + u − K,0) + J(¯ wD+d + εD+d − u − K,0)]
+Jw(¯ wD+t,t)(r ¯ wD+t − cD+t)+Jt(¯ wD+t,t)},
and the value matching condition at the optimal stopping date is:
J(¯ wD+d∗,d ∗)=E0 [J(¯ wD+d∗ + εd − K,0)].
To solve this problem, I guess that J(¯ w,t)=−(A(t)/αr)exp(−αr ¯ w),w h e r eA(t) is a time
varying function to be determined. The ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal choice of ct is:
u0(cD+t)=Jw(¯ wD+t,t) ⇔













where I used (55) to replace out consumption. Using the guess for the value function in this
equation gives the diﬀerential equation in Proposition 10. Since A(t) does not depend on ¯ wD+t,t h e
guess of the value function was valid. Using it in the value matching condition gives the boundary
condition. Finally, d∗ can be found by minimizing A(0).
Appendix G - Hybrid consumption-savings plans
The problem to solve is:





e−ρtu(θyt +˜ ct)dt + e−ρdZ(w0)
¸



















where the constraint is derived by combining the law of motion for assets, the deﬁnition of wealth,
and the consumption rule ct = θyt +˜ ct.




























The second line follows from the CARA form of the utility function and the normality of income,
and the third line from rearranging. I guess that the value function has the same exponential form







The ﬁrst order condition (56) at time 0, combined with this condition, leads to:
e−α(λy0+˜ c0) = αrAe−αrw ⇔
˜ c0 = −
ln(αrA)
α
+ rw − θy0 (59)
41Using the solutions for ˜ ct in (57) and ˜ c0 in (59) to substitute for the consumption terms in the

































Using the envelope theorem condition (58), together with the guess for the value function, the
















T h ef a c tt h a tA does not depend on the state wt or on any component of income, validates the





0 e−rtVa r[yt]dt +2 K + αrV ar[w0]
(erd − 1)
)
Since none of the expressions in this objective function depend on the sate of the economy, the
optimal d and λ are independent of the state. Using the stochastic processes for yT and yP,
Va r[yt] and Va r[w0] can be easily (but tediously) evaluated. Solving this minimization numerically
produces the results in Table 7.
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46Table 1: Optimal Inattentiveness Length  
 
  Parameter combinations (sP, sT, f, r, a) 
 
    
 Pischke  Riskless 
rate 




8 13  11 7  6  3 
K* 
 
$28 $12 $14 $36 $54 $324 
Notes: In the row with d* is optimal inattentiveness with K = $30.  In the row with K* are the costs of 
planning that would make optimal inattentiveness equal 8 quarters. The Pischke parameters are (45, 1962, 
0.487, 0.015, 2/6926). In the riskless rate column, r is lowered to 0.005. In the volatility 1-3 columns (sP, 
sT) equal (23, 1602), (68, 1601), and (90, 1599). In the Gourinchas-Parker column, the parameter values 
are (1014, x, ∞, 0.0085, 0.51/6926). 
 
 
Table 3: The Excess Smoothness Ratio 
 
Panel A: Estimates 
Method 
 
Lags  ψ Standard  Errors 
Bartlett window    5  .704  .065 
 10  .662  .088 
 20  .671  .129 
AR-HAC    2  .679  .088 
    5  .651  .115 
 10  .643  .159 
Andrews-Monahan    5  .515  .047 
 10  .559  .073 
 20  .584  .107 
Panel B: Predictions of the inattentiveness model 
Estimates of the weights Ф(i): 
 
ψ  
From news regressions in Table 2, with predictors:     
- lagged income  .660   
(restricted coefficients)  .570   
- lagged income and savings  .498   
(restricted coefficients)  .480   
- lagged income, savings and interest rates  .494   
(restricted coefficients)  .473   
Notes: The estimates of the excess smoothness ratio (ψ) use data on the change of log aggregate 
consumption from 1954 to 2002. The different methods used to obtain estimates of the spectrum at 
frequency zero were: a Bartlett kernel estimator with window length 5, 10 and 20; a parametric AR-HAC 
estimate using an AR with lags 2, 5 and 10; a Andrews-Monahan (1992) estimator which pre-whitens the 
data using an AR(1) and then uses a Bartlett kernel with window lengths 5, 10  and 20. Standard errors are 
obtained by the delta method, and using the result that asymptotically Var(h∆C(ω))=(4/3)*(M/N)*h∆C(ω) for 
the Bartlett kernel, where M is the window length, and N is the number of observations (see Priestley, 
1981, pages 457-461). Table 2: Regressing Consumption Growth on News on Income Growth 
 

























   
Restricted Least Squares estimates 
       
  .287 .084 .084 .084 .023 .001 .001 .001  0  0 
             
      F-test:  7.20
*** 
           (.000) 
Adj. R
2:
  .334 
 
F-test       3.55
*** 
1
st stage   (.004) 
 Adj. R
2:  .062 
1
st stage 
WIN:   4.71 
        (.701) 




























   
Restricted Least Squares estimates 
       
  .278 .080 .079 .079 .055 .032 .032 .032  0  0 
             
      F-test: 5.35
*** 
           (.000) 
Adj. R
2:
  .262  F-test       5.69
*** 
1
st stage   (.000) 
 Adj. R




        (.428) 





























  Restricted Least Squares estimates         
  .263 .073 .070 .070 .053 .035 .035 .035  .002  0 
                
      F-test: 4.66
*** 
           (.000) 
Adj. R
2:
  .229  F-test       3.96
*** 
1
st stage   (.000) 
 Adj. R
2:  .187 
1
st stage 
WIN:   8.11 
        (.374) 
Notes:  These are the estimates of the system of two equations: (first stage) yt  = ∆ln(Yt) – Et-1[∆ln(Yt)], and (second stage) ∆ln(Ct+1) = const. + β0yt+1 + β1yt + … 
+ β9yt-8 + ũt. 
***, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. In brackets below the estimates are Newey-West standard 
errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to 8 lags. The F-test is on the significance of the regression, and WIN tests the inattentive consumers 
model. In brackets below the test statistics are the p-values. Table 4: Excess Sensitivity and Hand-to-Mouth Behavior in the Inattentiveness Model 
 
Panel A. IV regressions 
































        
Panel B. Weak Instruments  
   Instruments for ∆ln(Yt+1): 
Estimates Test  statistics 
(p-values) 
 OLS  LIML  A-R  Moreira  LM 
          























          
Notes:  The dependent variable in all regressions is ∆ln(Ct+1).  
***, 
** and 
* denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The estimates use the Hayashi and Sims (1983) procedure with an 
estimated MA(9) to forward-filter the data. In Panel A, the J-stat. refers to the Hansen-Sargan statistic for 
testing the over-identifying restrictions associated with the validity of the instruments. In Panel B, A-R is 
the Anderson-Rubin test, Moreira is the conditional likelihood ratio test, and LM is the conditional 
Lagrange multiplier test (see Moreira, 2004).  Table 5: Rational Expectations vs. Campbell-Mankiw vs. Inattentiveness 
 
Panel A. Regression Estimates 
                  
Const. Et-Et-1 E t-1-Et-2 E t-2-Et-3 E t-3-Et-4 E t-4-Et-5 E t-5-Et-6 E t-6-Et-7 E t-7-Et-8 E t-8-Et-9 E t-9-Et-10 E t-10-Et-11 E t-11 
  ∆ln(Yt-1) 






* .104 .536  .790  .816
*** .680  1.010  -.498  .034 
(.002) (.163) (.255)  (.179)  (.166) (.161) (.367)  (1.023) (.315)  (.688)  (.543) (1.063)  (.453) 
                  
Restricted Estimates              
                  
.005 .394 .394  .394  .314 .314 .314  .314  .314 .314 .314  0  0 
                  
Unrestricted Adjusted R
2:  .090  Restricted Adjusted R
2:  .055   
Panel  B.  Tests  of  the  alternative  models 
            
Model Test  statistics 
(p-values) 
 Accept/Reject 
(5% significance level) 
    
Rational Expectations (Hall):  72.60 
(.000) 
 Reject       
Hand-to-mouth (Campbell-Mankiw):  18.80 
(.043) 
 Reject       
Inattentive consumers:  18.10 
(.080) 
 Accept       
Inattentive consumers and savers:  15.09 
(.128) 
 Accept       




* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation using a Newey-West procedure. Panel B displays Wald test statistics and asymptotic p-values in parentheses. 
 Table 6: Extraordinary Events and the Length of Inattentiveness  
 
Panel A: Inattentiveness 
 
 
u = $500  u = $2,500  u = $5,000 
δ = 1/8 
 
10 10 11 
δ = 1/20 
 
9 9 9 
δ = 1/40 
 
8 9 9 
Panel B: Probability of planning in response to an extraordinary event 
 
 
u = $500  u = $2,500  u = $5,000 
δ = 1/8 
 
71% 71% 75% 
δ = 1/20 
 
36% 36% 36% 
δ = 1/40 
 
18% 20% 20% 





2. The costs of planning K were 
set at $30 so that without extraordinary events, the agent plans every 8 quarters. 
 
 
Table 7: Optimal Hybrid Consumption-Savings Plans  
 
Panel A: Inattentiveness(d) 
 
 
K = $30  K = $100  K = $250  K = $500  K = $1000 
r = 0.5% 
 
13 24 36 50  67 
r = 1.5% 
 
10 16 23 31  41 
r = 4% 
 
6 9  12  15 20 
Panel B: Optimal share of income shocks consumed (q) 
 
 
K = $30  K = $100  K = $250  K = $500  K = $1000 
r = 0.5% 
 
0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04  0.04 
r = 1.5% 
 
0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08  0.09 
r = 4% 
 
0.13 0.14 0.16 0.17  0.19 
Notes: The remaining parameters were set at the benchmark values as in Table 6. Figure 2. Estimates of the Inattentiveness Weights
Figure 1. Impulse Response of Aggregate Consumption
to a Permanent Shock




























Estimate Confidence intervalFigure 3. Predicted and Actual Normalised Spectral Densities
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Panel B. Cumulative inattentiveness weight from income news 
regressions
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